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Our ongoing analysis of the effects of pension plan provisions on retirement is 
pursued  in this paper. The work to date has emphasized  the dramatic effect 
of  employer-provided pension  plan provisions  on  age of  retirement  and the 
enormous effects of  changing the provisions. The work has also highlighted 
the important limitations of using Social Security provisions to predict retire- 
ment behavior, without accounting for the effect of employer pension plan pro- 
visions, which, for employees who have such plans, is typically much more 
powerful than the effect of Social Security provisions. 
Two aspects of our work have guided the analysis as the research progressed. 
The first is that a new method has been used to model retirement  decisions. 
The second is that the empirical analysis has been based on data from individ- 
ual firms. Thus we have been led to consider whether the model provided accu- 
rate predictions  of the effects of plan provisions on retirement  and whether 
the behavioral implications of analysis based on data from one firm could be 
generalized to other firms with different plan provisions. 
In two initial papers, Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) developed an “option 
value” model of retirement. The central feature of this model is that in deciding 
whether to retire employees are assumed to compare the “value” of  retiring 
now to the maximum of  the expected values of retiring at all future retirement 
ages. If the maximum of the future values is greater than the value of retirement 
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now, the employee continues to work. We tested the predictive validity of this 
model in two ways: first, we considered the “within-sample  fit” of the model, 
by comparing the actual pattern of retirement by  age to the pattern predicted 
by  the  model,  based  on the data used for estimation. Second, in papers  by 
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1990, 1991) we emphasized an external “out- 
of-sample’’ check of  predictive validity, by  considering  how well the model 
predicted the effect on retirement of an unanticipated  and temporary change 
in the pension plan provisions, occasioned by an early retirement window plan. 
In a subsequent paper, Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992) compared the pre- 
dictive validity of the option value model with that of two versions of stochastic 
dynamic programming  models. The stochastic dynamic programming model 
is close in spirit to the option value model, but the prediction of retirement is 
based on the comparison of the value of retirement now to the expected value 
of  the maximum of  the values  of  future retirement  ages. The evidence  was 
that the option value model predicted just as well as the  stochastic dynamic 
programming models, but had the advantage of being much less complex nu- 
merically. Ausink  (1991) pursued  a similar comparison  based on retirement 
from the military and found that the option value version was noticeably better 
than the stochastic dynamic programming versions. 
All of these papers, with the exception of the work by Ausink, are based on 
data from a single firm. The use of firm data was motivated by the absence of 
information on pension plan provisions in standard data sources, such as the 
Retirement History Survey, and by  the realization that the incentives inherent 
in  such plans  could be very  substantial  and varied  widely  among firms, as 
shown  in  papers  by  Bulow  (1981), Lazear  (1983), and  Kotlikoff  and  Wise 
(1985, 1987, 1988). In principle, the ideal data source would provide retire- 
ment information and pension plan information for a random  sample of em- 
ployees, from a wide range of firms. Such information has not been available. 
The alternative  we followed was to obtain  data from several different firms. 
The hope was that similar results from different firms would tend to confirm 
the validity of the model, even though the firms themselves could not be con- 
sidered a random sample of all firms. Thus there is a need to determine whether 
the results for the single firm are confirmed based on data from other firms. 
Therefore, the first goal of this paper is to use data from a new firm to con- 
firm that the age pattern of retirement corresponds to the pension plan provis- 
ions. Descriptive analysis confirms that this is the case. 
A second emphasis in this paper is the comparison of the retirement behav- 
ior of men and women. It is sometimes proposed that women may tend to retire 
earlier than  men because they are typically younger than their husbands and 
they may tend to retire when their husbands do. From descriptive analysis, it 
is clear that the retirement patterns of men and women are not appreciably dif- 
ferent. 
A third goal is to add another observation to the list of  comparisons of the 
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programming model. Predictive validity in this paper is judged by the model 
predictions of retirement under a special 1983 early retirement incentive plan. 
The models are estimated based on retirement decisions in 1982. The goal of 
the comparisons  is to accumulate  data on the extent to which  the  different 
models predict actual retirement choices and thus to determine which specifi- 
cation best approximates the considerations  that determine actual retirement 
decisions. The emphasis is not on which model best approximates the econo- 
mists’ view of  the “right” calculation, but rather which best approximates the 
calculations that the typical person makes. Or, better still, which predicts best 
the retirement decisions of the typical employee. 
A  fourth goal is to make limited inferences  about the potential  effect of 
Medicare availability on retirement, especially at age 65. We have found in our 
previous work that model predictions  of  the age-65 retirement rate are typi- 
cally much lower than the actual rate. We have attributed the high actual rate 
to an “age-65 retirement  effect.” But our work, and we believe the work of 
others, has ignored the  potential effect of  Medicare insurance that becomes 
available  at  age 65. The approach  used  here is to consider  how  retirement 
rates-especially  at  age 65-would  be affected  were  Medicare  valued  ac- 
cording to the average payments to the covered population. The final goal is 
to compare parameter estimates based on data from two firms with different 
pension plans.’ 
6.1  Background 
6.1.1  The Firm I11 Plan 
Employees are covered by a defined-benefit pension plan with normal retire- 
ment at age 65 and early retirement at age 55.  Cliff vesting occurs at 10 years 
of service (YOS) or at age 65, whichever comes first. The normal retirement 
benefit at 65 depends on earnings, age, and years of  service at retirement (that 
is, at the time of departure from the firm). A person can retire and elect to start 
receiving benefits before age 65, but the normal benefit will be reduced by 5 
percent  for each  year  that  receipt  of  benefits  precedes  age  65, as  shown 
in  figure  6.1. A person  who retired  at  age  55, for example, would  receive 
50 percent of the normal retirement benefit of a person who left the firm at age 
65. (The normal benefit also depends on years of service at the time of retire- 
ment.) 
However, if a person has 30 years of service at retirement and if the person 
is age 60 or older, the person is eligible for 100 percent of the normal benefit. 
Benefits are reduced 5 percent for each year that retirement precedes age 60, 
I. In order to maintain numerical consistency throughout our work, we refer to the firm used in 
this analysis as ‘‘firm 111.’’ The comparison firm, used in Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) and Lums- 
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Fig. 6.1  Early retirement benefit (% of normal age-65 benefit) 
if the person has 30 years of service. For example, a person who retired at age 
55 with 30 years of service would receive 75  percent of the normal benefit. 
Even a person who retires before age 55 and is vested can elect to receive 
benefits from the pension plan as early as age 55, but like the post-55 retiree, 
benefits are reduced 5 percent for each year that receipt of the benefits precedes 
age 65. Of course, this person's benefits would be based on earnings, age, and 
years of service at the time of retirement, unadjusted for earnings inflation, and 
would thus be lower than the benefits of a person who retired later. 
Employees who joined the firm before 1951 can retire as early as age 50 and 
begin to receive benefits immediately, but at a reduced rate. An employee hired 
before  1951 had  at least 31 years of  service in  1982. The reduction for this 
group is indicated by the extended line that indicates benefits at age 50 to be 
54.3 percent of the age-60 benefits for an employee who has 30 or more years 
of service at retirement. 
To  understand the effect of the pension plan provisions, figure 6.2A shows 
the expected future compensation of a person from our sample who is 5 1 years 
old  and has been  employed by  the firm for 23 years.  To  compute the  data 
graphed in figures 6.2A-6.20,  a 5 percent real discount rate and a 6 percent 
inflation rate are assumed. The discount rate is estimated in the empirical anal- 
ysis, and the inflation rate is assumed to be 6 percent. Total compensation from 
the firm can be viewed as the sum of wage earnings, the accrual of pension 
benefits, and the accrual of  Social Security benefits. (This omits medical and 
other unobserved  benefits  that  should be included  as compensation, but for 
which we have no data.) As compensation for working another year, the em- I 
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ployee receives salary earnings. Compensation is also received in the form of 
future pension benefits. The annual compensation in this form is the change in 
the present value of  the future pension benefits entitlement, due to working an 
additional year. This accrual is comparable to wage earnings. The accrual of 
Social Security  benefits  may  be calculated  in a similar manner, and is also 
comparable to wage earnings. Figure 6.2A  shows the present value at age 5 I 
of expected future compensation in all three forms. Wage earnings represents 
cumulated earnings, by age of retirement from the firm (more precisely, by age 
of  departure  from the  firm, since some  workers might  continue to  work  in 
another job). For example, the cumulated wage earnings of this employee be- 
tween age 5 1 and age 60, were he to retire at age 60, would be about $482,000, 
discounted to age-51 dollars. The slope of  the wage earnings line represents 
annual earnings discounted to age-5  1 dollars, 
The pension  line  shows  the  accrual  of  firm  pension  benefits,  again  dis- 
counted to age-5 1 dollars. The shape of  this profile is determined by  the pen- 
sion plan provisions. The present value of accrued pension benefit entitlements 
at age 5 1 is about $54,000. The present value of retirement benefits increases 
between  ages 51 and 57 because  years of  service and nominal  earnings in- 
crease. An employee could leave the firm at age 53, for example. If he were to 
do that and if  he were vested in the firm’s pension plan, he would be entitled 
to normal retirement pension benefits at age 65, based on his years of service 
and nominal dollar earnings at age 53. He could choose to start receiving bene- 
fits as early as age 55, the pension early retirement age, but the benefit amount 
would be reduced 5 percent for each year that the receipt of benefits preceded 
age 65. Because  5  percent  is less than the actuarially fair discount rate, the 
present value of benefits of  a person  who leaves the firm before age 55 are 
always greatest if receipt of benefits begins at 55. 
Recall that a person who has accumulated 30 years of service and is 55 or 
older is entitled to increased retirement benefits that would reach  100 percent 
of normal retirement benefits  at age 60. No early retirement reduction is ap- 
plied to benefits if they are taken then. So a person at age 60 with 30 years of 
service who continues to work will no longer gain 5 percent a year from fewer 
years of early retirement reduction, as occurs before age 60. There is a jump 
in the benefits  of a person younger than 60 who attains 30 years of  service. 
That accounts for the jump in the benefits of the person depicted in the figure 
624,  when he attains 30 years of service at age 58. 
The Social Security (SS) accrual profile is determined by the Social Security 
benefit provisions. The present value of accrued Social Security benefit entitle- 
ments at age 51 is about $33,000. Social Security benefits cannot begin until 
age 62. If real earnings do not change much between ages 5 1 and 62, then real 
Social Security benefits at age 62 will not change much either. After age 62, 
the actuarial adjustment is such that the present value of benefits, evaluated at 
the age of retirement, does not depend on the retirement age. But the present 
value of  the benefits  discounted  to the  same age (51 in this case) declines. 189  Pension Plan Provisions and Retirement 
There is a further drop after age 65, because the actuarial adjustment is reduced 
from 7 percent to 3 percent. 
The top line (Tot comp) shows total compensation.  For example, the wage 
earnings of  an employee who left the firm at age 60 would increase $482,000 
between ages 5 1 and 60, shown by the wage earnings line. Thereafter, the em- 
ployee would receive firm pension plan and Social Security retirement benefits 
with a present value-at  age 51-of  about $170,000. The sum of the two is 
about  $652,000, shown by  the top line. Compared to total compensation of 
$575,000 between ages 5 1 and 60, an average of $63,000 per year, total com- 
pensation  between  ages 60 and 65 would  be only $100,000, or $23,000 per 
year.  Thus the  monetary  reward  for continued work  declines  dramatically 
with age. 
Figures 6.2B-6.20  show comparable compensation profiles for employees 
who are ages 57, 60, and 64, respectively, in  1982; they have 29, 38, and 45 
years of  service, respectively.  The person  depicted in figure 6.2B attains 30 
years of service at age 58; thus the jump in pension benefits at that age. The 
present  value  of  pension  plus  Social Security  compensation (Pen  +  SS) 
reaches a maximum at age 59 and declines thereafter. Were this employee to 
continue to work  after age 59, until 65, the present value of  total retirement 
benefits would fall by $33,000, offsetting about 28 percent of the present value 
of  wage earnings over this period  ($117,000). A  similar prospect  faces the 
employee depicted in figure 6.2C but this employee is already entitled to 100 
percent of normal retirement benefits and loses benefits for each year that he 
continues to work. 
The employee who faces the figure 6.20 compensation  profile is 64 years 
old and loses both pension and Social Security benefits for each year that re- 
tirement is postponed. At age 65, for example, about 54 percent of expected 
wage earnings would be offset by  a reduction in retirement benefits, if retire- 
ment were postponed. 
6.1.2  The 1983 Window 
Under the window plan, which was in effect from January 1 to February 28, 
1983, all employees were eligible for a separation bonus, but the most gener- 
ous payments were available to persons age 55 and older who had at least 21 
years of service. Retirement benefits for this group were increased depending 
on age and years of  service. For example, a person age 59 with 28 years of 
service could receive 100 percent of normal retirement benefits, instead of 70 
percent under the regular plan. That is, this person’s retirement benefit would 
be increased by 43 percent. A person who was age 55 with 2 1 years of service 
could receive 55 percent of the normal benefits, instead of 50 percent. Persons 
age 60 or older with 30 years of service were eligible for 100 percent of normal 
benefits under the regular plan. 
In addition, all employees were eligible for a separation bonus equal to one 
week’s pay for every year of service, with a minimum of 2 weeks and a maxi- 190  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
mum of 26 weeks of pay. Thus even persons who were under 55 and those who 
were  eligible for 100 percent  of  normal retirement  benefits  faced an added 
inducement to retire. 
6.1.3  The Data 
The data used in the analysis are drawn from the personnel  records of all 
persons employed by the firm at any time between  1979 and 1988. A year-end 
file is available for each year. Earnings records back to 1979 (or to the date of 
hire, if after 1979)  are available for each employee. In addition, the data contain 
some demographic  information,  such as date of  birth, gender, marital status, 
and occupational group. The retirement date of employees who retire is also 
known. (More generally, the date of any departure is known, and the reason for 
the departure is recorded.)  Thus we  are able to determine whether a person 
who was employed at age a was also employed at age a + 1, and if not, the 
exact age at which the employee left the firm. 
The estimation of the retirement model in this paper is based on 1982 data, 
whether or not an employee left the firm in  1982. (To simplify the determina- 
tion of age of  retirement, only employees born in January and February and 
who had not retired before March 1, 1982, are used in this analysis.) The pri- 
mary  test  of  the predictive validity  of  the model  is based  on how  well  the 
model, estimated  on  1982 data, predicts  retirement  under the  1983 window 
plan that substantially increased standard retirement benefits. 
6.2  Departure Rates for Men versus Women 
6.2.1  Life-Cycle Departure Rates 
Firm departure rates for employees aged 20-70  are shown in figure 6.3. The 
graph reflects average departure rates over the years 1979-82.  After substantial 
turnover at younger ages, annual departure rates fall continuously to 1-2  per- 
cent at ages 45-54.  Employees start to leave the firm in larger numbers at age 
55, the early retirement age. 
Figures 6.4A-6.4C  compare the departure rates for men and women. Figure 
6.4A pertains  to employees  with less than  10 years  of  service, who are not 
vested in the firm’s pension plan. Figure 6.4B pertains to employees with 10- 
29 years of service, and figure 6.4C to those with 30 or more years of service. 
The striking aspect of the graphs is that there is virtually no difference between 
the departure rates of men and women, except at the principle child-bearing 
ages-say,  23 to 37. For example, between ages 37 and 54 the turnover rates 
of men and women with 10-29  years of service are almost identical. Among 
employees with less than  10 years of  service, there is little difference in the 
departure rates of men and women between ages 37 and 65. Men and women 
with 30 or more years of  service have almost identical departure rates at all 
ages. 191  Pension Plan Provisions and Retirement 
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Fig. 6.3  Departure rates by age: men and women together 
6.2.2  Retirement-Age Departure Rates 
The departure rates for persons aged 50 and above are shown in figure 6.5 
for men and women. These rates are based on 1982 data only. There is a notice- 
able increase in departure rates at age 55, from less than 1 percent for persons 
50-54  years old to 3 or 4 percent for employees 55-59  years old. Although the 
increase in the annual departure may seem small, the cumulative effect of the 
increase is substantial. For example, with a 4 percent annual departure rate, 19 
percent of persons in the firm at age 54 will leave before age 60. At a 1 percent 
annual rate, only 5 percent will leave. 
There is also a sharp increase at age 60, the age at which persons with 30 
years of service are entitled to 100 percent of  normal (age-65) benefits. The 
sharp increases at ages 62 and 65 correspond to the Social Security early and 
normal retirement ages. 
The plan provisions suggest that for employees age 55-64,  and especially 
those 55-60  or 61, the departure rate for persons with 30 or more years of 
service should be higher than the rate for persons with less than 30 years of 
service. The descriptive data are shown in figure 6.6. The departure rates for 
men with 30 or more years of service are higher in the 55-61  age range. They 
are also higher for women at age 60, but the differences at other ages are small. 
Women with less than 30 years of  service appear more likely than men to take 
early retirement between the ages of  55 and 6 1. 
These data also reveal what may be an individual-specific work effect. Em- 
ployees with 30 or more years of service who have not retired before age 65 are 192  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
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thereafter less likely to retire than employees with less than 30 years of service. 
In summary: even without formal analysis, the graphs make it clear that the 
pattern of departures reflects the provisions of the pension plan. The pattern is 
also consistent with Social Security provisions, but the magnitude of the age- 
65 departure rate seems much more abrupt than the reduction in Social Secu- 
rity  benefits  at age 65 would  suggest. These graphs also make it clear that 
there is little appreciable  difference between  the retirement  patterns of  men 
and women, with the possible exception of a greater likelihood of early retire- 
ment for women with less than 30 years of service. But in general, there is no 
evidence  of  a  substantial  difference in  the retirement  patterns  of  men  and 
women. 
6.2.3  Window-Plan Retirement Rates 
Departure rates under the  1983 window plan are shown for men in figure 
6.7A and for women in figure 6.7B. These rates are contrasted with the average 
1982 rates, shown on the same graph. Departure rates under the window plan 
were typically three to five times as large as the 1982 rates. Like 1982 depar- 
tures, there was little difference in the departure rates of men and women under 
the window plan, as shown in figure 6.8. There is, however, some indication 
that women under age 55 may have been more likely than men to accept the 
separation bonus. 
6.3  Formal Models and Prediction of Retirement 
6.3.1  Models 
Two models  are compared during  the course of  the analysis: the “option 
value”  model  and a stochastic  dynamic programming  model.  Both  are de- 
scribed in Lumsdaine et al. (1992), and excerpts from that paper are included 
as an appendix to this chapter. The models are explained only briefly here. 
The Option Value Model 
At any given age, based on information available at that age, it is assumed 
that an employee compares the expected present value of retiring at that age 
with the value of retiring at each age in the future through age 74. The maxi- 
mum of the expected present values of retiring at each future age, minus the 
expected present value of immediate retirement, is called the option value of 
postponing retirement. A person who does not retire this year maintains the 
option of retiring at a more advantageous age later on. If the option value is 
positive, the person continues to work; otherwise she retires. With reference to 
figure 6.1, for example, at  age 5 1 the employee would compare the value of 
the retirement benefits that she would receive were she to retire then-approxi- 
mately $87,000-with  the value of wage earnings and retirement benefits  in 195  Pension Plan Provisions and Retirement 
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each future year. The expected present value of  retiring at age 60 (discounted 
to age 5 l),  for example, is about $652,000.  Future earnings forecasts are based 
on the individual's past earnings, as well as on the earnings of other persons in 
the firm. The precise model specification follows. 
A person at age t who continues to work will earn Y,  at subsequent ages s. 
If the person retires at age I;  subsequent retirement benefits will be B,5(r).  These 
benefits will depend on the person's age and years of service at retirement and 
on his  earnings  history;  thus they are a function  of  the retirement  age. We 
suppose that in deciding whether to retire the person weighs the indirect utility 
that will be received from future income. Discounted to age t at the rate p, the 
value of this future stream of income, if retirement is at age I;  is given by 196  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
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where U,(Y,)  is the indirect utility of  future wage income and Ur(Bs(r))  is the 
indirect utility  of  future retirement benefits.  It is assumed that the employee 
will not live past age S. The expected gain, evaluated at age t, from postponing 
retirement until age r is given by 
(2)  G,(r) = E,V,(r) -  E,V,(t). 
If r* is the age that gives the maximum expected gain, the person will postpone 
retirement if the option value, G,(r*),  is positive: 
(3) 
The utilities of future wage and retirement income are parameterized as 
G,(r*) = E,V,(r*) -  E,V,(t) > 0. 
(44 
(4b) 
where w,  and 6, are individual-specific random effects, assumed to follow a 
Markovian (first-order autoregressive) process: 
UJYJ = y:  + wI  I 
UP3)  = W,(r)lY + 5,  1 
(54  w,  = pw,-] + E,,,  E3-1(Ew,) = 0  > 
(5b)  5, = P6,-,  + E@'  Es-I(E*s)  = 0 . 197  Pension Plan Provisions and Retirement 
The parameter k reflects that, in considering whether to retire, the employee’s 
utility associated with a dollar of income while retired may be different from 
her  utility  associated  with  a dollar of  income accompanied by  work.  Ab- 
stracting from the random terms, at any given age s, the ratio of the utility of 
retirement to the utility of employment is [k(Bs/YJ]v. 
The Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model 
The key  simplifying assumption  in the Stock-Wise option value model is 
that the retirement decision is based on the maximum of the expected present 
values of future utilities if retirement occurs now versus at each of the potential 
future ages. The stochastic dynamic programming  rule considers instead the 
expected value of the maximum of current versus future options. The expected 
value of the maximum of a series of random variables will be greater than the 
maximum  of the expected values. Thus, to the extent that this difference is 
large, the Stock-Wise option value rule underestimates the value of postponing 
retirement. And, to the extent that the dynamic programming rule is more con- 
sistent with individual  decisions  than the option  value rule, the Stock-Wise 
rule may undervalue individual assessment of future retirement options. Thus 
we consider a model that rests on the dynamic programming rule. 
It is important to understand that there is no single dynamic programming 
model. Because the dynamic programming decision rule evaluates the maxi- 
mum of  future disturbance terms, its implementation depends importantly on 
the error  structure  that  is assumed. Like other users  of  this  type of  model, 
we assume an error structure-and  thus a behavioral rule-that  simplifies the 
dynamic programming  calculation.2 In particular,  although  the option value 
model allows correlated disturbances, the random disturbances in the dynamic 
programming model are assumed to be uncorrelated. Thus the two models are 
not exactly comparable. Whether one rule is a better approximation to reality 
than the other may depend not only on the basic idea, but on its precise imple- 
mentation. In the version of  the dynamic programming model that we imple- 
ment here, the  disturbances  are assumed  to follow  an extreme  value distri- 
bution. 
In most respects, our dynamic programming model is analogous to the op- 
tion value model. As in that model, at age r an individual is assumed to derive 
utility  UJYJ + c,,  from earned  income or U,(B,(s)) + eZr  from retirement 
benefits, where s is the retirement age. The disturbances cj,  and eZr  are random 
perturbations to these age-specific utilities. Unlike the additive disturbances in 
the option value model, these additive disturbances in the dynamic program- 
ming  model  are assumed  to be  independent. Future income and retirement 
benefits are assumed to be nonrandom; there are no errors in forecasting future 
wage earnings or retirement benefits. 
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6.3.2  Results 
Parameter estimates are shown in table 6.1. The effect of  the special plan 
provisions for the pre-1951 hires is considered  first (cols. [l] and [2]). Esti- 
mates for men versus women and stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) ver- 
sus option value (OV) estimates are then considered (cols. [3]-[8]).  Estimates 
with the “value” of Medicare and firm retiree health insurance benefits counted 
as equivalent to Social Security benefits, and with firm current employee health 
insurance benefits counted as equivalent to wage earnings, are also presented 
(col. [9]). Finally,  results  imposing  firm I parameter  estimates  (taken from 
Lumsdaine et al. 1992) on the firm I11 data are reported (col. [lo]). 
Pre-1951 Pension Plan Provisions 
The estimates in column (1) are based on the assumption that the pre- 195  1 
hires face the same pension plan provisions as later hires. These estimates, as 
well as those in column (2), are based on a sample of 400 employees. Taken 
literally, the estimated value of y (1.045) suggests that with respect to retire- 
ment income employees are essentially risk neutral. The estimated value of k 
is 1.605, implying that a dollar of retirement benefit income-unaccompanied 
by work-is  valued at 60 percent more than a dollar of income accompanied 
by  work. These estimates  are very similar to those obtained  in our previous 
work. The estimated value of p, however, is extremely small. If taken literally, 
it would suggest that in making retirement  decisions, future income is given 
very little weight, compared to income in the current year. Indeed, a value of 
zero would imply that the decision to retire is based only on the comparison 
of wage income versus retirement  benefits-the  replacement  ratio-without 
concern for future possibilities. When the immediate ratio is large enough, the 
person retires. (Based on our experience elsewhere, we are not inclined to be- 
lieve this estimate.) 
The model fits the data rather well, however, as shown in figures 6.9A and 
6.9B. The principal discrepancy between actual and predicted rates occurs at 
age 55, where the jump in the predicted rates is noticeably less than the jump 
in the sample rates. The sample data show a 10 percent departure rate at age 
55, which is twice as large as the rates shown in the graphs above, based on 
larger sample sizes. The predicted  and actual cumulative departure rates are 
very close. Based on the likelihood values, the model fits the data better than 
a model with dummy variables for each age-that  is, better than predictions 
based on average retirement rates by  age. The model does not allow directly 
for an effect of age on retirement. 
The primary test of the predictive validity of the model is how well it pre- 
dicts retirement rates under the 1983 window plan. The model predictions cap- 
ture the general pattern of retirement under the window, but substantially over- 
predict retirement rates between ages 55 and 60, as shown in figure 6.9C. The 
model also predicts some retirements among employees aged 52-54,  whereas 
the actual data show essentially no retirements in this age group. Table 6.1  Parameter Estimates by Method and Sample 
Pre- 195 1 Provisions  Option Value versus SDP Modcl and Men versus Women 
OV Model  SDP Model  Firm I 
Medicare  Comparison 
SDP Model  SDP Model  Men  Men  SDP Model  SDP Model 
Pre-5  1 Ignore  Pre-5  1 Correct  Men  Women  and Women  Men  Women  and Women  Men and Women  Men 
Parameter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
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Fig. 6.9  Predicted vs. actual (A) annual departure rates, (B)  cumulative 
departure rates, and (C) window departure rates: men, ignoring pre-1951 
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The estimates in column (2) of table 6.1 are obtained if the special pension 
plan provisions that pertain to employees hired before  195  1 are used to deter- 
mine their options.  (Because there are so few retirements  among employees 
younger than 55, we have questioned whether these provisions translate into 
visible alternatives that are actively considered by older employees, or whether 
in practice these older employees consider their options to be the same as em- 
ployees of the same age who are covered by the current plan provisions. Thus 
we have obtained the two sets of  estimates.) The estimated parameter values 
are very similar to those reported in column (l), although to hasten conver- 
gence the discount factor is set in this case. Predicted versus actual rates are 
shown in figures 6.1OA-6.1OC.  In general, the fit to actual values is close. The 
major exception is at age 55, and in this case the actual sample rate is abnor- 
mally high; the predicted rate is more in line with typical retirement rates at 
this age. The difference in the age-55 retirement rate is reflected in the differ- 
ence between the actual and predicted  cumulative rates through age 60. The 
model predictions of the effects of the  1983 window are very accurate, with 
the exception of  predictions for employees aged 53-54  and 56-57.  The actual 
sample rates for the 56-57  ages are abnormally low; the typical rates are more 
like the model predictions. Thus for these ages at least, the model predictions 
give  a more accurate  indication  of  actual  behavior  than  the  actual  sample 
values. 
Stochastic Dynamic Programming versus  “Option Value” Estimates 
The two sets of parameter values are shown for men (cols. [3] and [6]), for 
women (cols. [4] and [7]), and for men and women combined (cols. [5] and 
[S]). In general, the estimated parameters are similar. The most noticeable dif- 
ference is that the SDP estimated values of p are lower than the OV estimates. 
For men and women combined, for example, the SDP estimate is 0.564 and 
the OV estimate is 0.963. The estimated value of k based on the OV model is 
somewhat larger than the SDP estimate  (2.408 vs.  1.877), and the estimated 
value of y is somewhat smaller (0.656 vs. 0.839). 
The OV model fits the sample data considerably better than the SDP model, 
based on the likelihood and xz  values pertaining to the fitted data. This is re- 
vealed graphically for men in figures 6.11A and 6.1  1B versus figures 6.12A and 
6.12B. On the other hand, the SDP model predictions of  retirement under the 
1983 window fit actual retirement rates better than do those of the OV model. 
This can be seen by comparing figures 6.11 C and 6.12C and in the x2 values 
pertaining  to the window. Thus, in general, there is no reason to prefer one 
model over the other. 
Separate Estimates for  Men and Women 
The estimates for men and women are not statistically different, judged by 
likelihood ratio tests. The OV model x2  statistic is 9.06 (and with four degrees 
of freedom, the .05 significance level is 9.49), and the SDP model x2  statistic + Actual Rates  +  Predlcted Rates  I-  -~ 
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Fig. 6.10  Predicted vs. actual (A) annual departure rates, (B)  cumulative 
departure rates, and (0  window departure rates: men, including pre-1951 
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Fig. 6.12  Predicted vs. actual (A) annual departure rates, (B)  cumulative 
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is only 3.98, neither of which is statistically significant. The t-statistics for the 
individual parameters also suggest that the estimates for men and women are 
not  statistically different. Thus the formal estimates  appear to be consistent 
with the graphical evidence in figures 6.4. 6.5; 6.6, and 6.8 showing that depar- 
ture rates for men and women are virtually indistinguishable after age 40. 
Valuing Medicare 
The OV and the  SDP models underpredict  retirement  at age 65 for both 
men and women. A possible reason for the underprediction  is that Medicare 
insurance becomes available at age 65 and provides an inducement  to retire 
similar to the Social Security  inducement. But  employees at this  firm have 
health insurance while working, and after retirement the same coverage is pro- 
vided, at no cost to the retiree. For example, a person who retired at  age 60 
would be covered by retiree health insurance until age 65. After age 65, medi- 
cal costs up to the Medicare limit would be paid by  Medicare, and any addi- 
tional costs-that  are covered  by  the firm plan-would  be paid by  the firm 
retiree insurance. A simple assumption, albeit one that is unlikely to be pre- 
cisely true, is that medical insurance is valued at its cost, which is treated by 
employees as comparable to wage or pension benefit compensation. Following 
this rule, there are three parts to medical coverage: First, while employed at 
the firm, health benefits are valued at the cost of insurance to the firm.' Second, 
if the person retires before age 65, firm pension benefits are increased by  the 
cost of insurance with coverage comparable to the retiree health in~urance.~ 
After age 65, Social Security benefits are increased according to the average 
payment to persons covered by  Medi~are.~  Estimates incorporating  these as- 
sumptions and based on the SDP model for men and women are reported in 
column (9) of table 6.1. 
The parameter estimates are affected very little, relative to comparable esti- 
mates without these adjustments, shown in column (8). The likelihood value 
and the fitted-data x2  statistic are almost the same as in the comparable column 
(8) estimates, that do not account for the value of medical insurance. In particu- 
lar, the addition of these measures of the value of medical insurance does noth- 
ing to explain the departure rate at age 65, as can be seen in figure 6.13A. The 
3. This cost was estimated by the average cost at large firms for group insurance with coverage 
like the plan offered by our fim-$105  and $247 for individual and family coverage, respectively, 
in  1989 dollars. These costs were deflated  to 1982 dollars based on a constructed index of  Blue- 
Cross-Blue-Shield  premiums per insured person, obtained from the U.S. Health Insurance Insti- 
tute (1991). We are grateful to Jonathan Gruber for assistance in developing these numbers. 
4. The value of  this insurance was estimated by  increasing the basic group insurance premium 
according to age, by  5.4 percent per year for each year after age 50. This rate  is based  on the 
annual premium costs by age reported by the Congressional Research Service (1988). 
5. The costs were estimated based on the average  1986 Medicare payments by age to married 
and  single  persons, reported in  Shoven, Topper, and Wise (chap.  I  in this volume). The  1986 
values were deflated to 1982 dollars based on the Blue-Cross-Blue-Shield  index described in n. 
3, above. Linear Interpolation  was used to convert the payments by age interval, reported  by  Sho- 
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Fig. 6.13  Predicted vs. actual (A) annual departure rates, (B)  cumulative 
departure rates, and (C)  window departure rates: men and women, SDP, 
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actual rate is .636, but the predicted rate is only .215, somewhat lower than the 
predicted rate without accounting for medical insurance (.277, based on col. 
[8] estimates). In addition, the model yields worse predictions  of retirement 
under the window plan, judging by  the window x2  statistic. Thus these results 
lend no support to the conjecture that retirement at age 65 is strongly affected 
by the availability of Medicare at that age. However, these exploratory results 
should not be interpreted to mean that Medicare does not matter. It may well 
be that the rough specification that we experimented with does not capture the 
effect of Medicare but that a more careful treatment of the value of medical 
coverage would show an effect. For example, the assumption that medical in- 
surance is valued at its cost may be incorrect. 
Estimates from Firms I and Ill Compared 
The parameter  estimates  based  on  firm I11  data are surprisingly  close to 
those based on firm I data. Results, for firm 111, with parameter estimates set 
to those that we obtained for firm I (Lumsdaine et al. 1992) are shown in col- 
umn (10) of table 6.1  .6 By comparing the estimates in columns (6) and (lo), it 
can be seen that the firm I estimates for men are very close to the estimates for 
firm 111,  based on the SDP specification. The hypothesis that the parameters 
are the same cannot be rejected, based on a likelihood ratio test. From the x2 
statistics, however, it is clear that the firm I parameter estimates do not fit the 
data or predict departure rates under the window plan quite as well as the firm 
111 estimates. Option value model estimates for the two firms (not shown) are 
also similar but not as close as the SDP estimates, and the hypothesis that the 
estimates are the same is rejected  at the 5 percent level. Again, based on  x2 
statistics, the firm I estimates do not fit the data or predict window departure 
rates  as well  as the  firm 111  parameter  estimates.  On balance, however,  the 
results provide  strong confirmation that  employees  in  these two firms react 
similarly to the incentives inherent in pension plan provisions. 
6.4  Summary and Conclusions 
The data for firm 111 confirm a principal conclusion based on firm I data. It 
is clear that the changes in retirement rates by age correspond closely to provis- 
ions of the pension plan. And, as for the results based on  firm I, we find that 
the OV and the SDP models yield similar results. There is no apparent reason 
to choose one over the other, except based on numerical simplicity. In this case, 
the OV model fits the sample data better than the SDP model, but the SDP 
model predicts the window plan retirement rates better than the OV model. We 
also find that there is essentially no difference between the retirement behavior 
of men and women. There is some indication that women may be slightly more 
6. The scale parameter u  was estimated; this normalization enables comparison of  the results 
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likely than men to take early retirement between ages 55 and 60. But at most 
ages, the annual retirement rates of men and women are very close. In addition, 
we explored the possibility that retirement at age 65 is induced by Medicare 
benefits that become available at that age. Our method of incorporating medi- 
cal insurance, however, did little to explain the large retirement rates at age 65. 
Thus we are still left with an “age-65 retirement effect” that is not explained 
by monetary gain. 
Appendix 
The “option value” and stochastic dynamic programming models used in the 
analysis are described. 
The Option Value Model 
function G,(r)  can be decomposed into two components, 
(All 
where g,(r)  and +,(r)  distinguish the terms in G,(r)  containing the random ef- 
fects, w  and t,  from the other terms. If whether the person  is alive in future 
years is statistically independent of  his earnings stream and of the individual 
effects w,  and &, g,(r)  and +,(r)  are given by 
(A24  g,(r) = ~:I,’PS-‘.rr(slW,(Y?)  + ~~_,P”.rr(slt)[~,(~~~(~))yl  - 
Given the specification as described  via equations (1)-(5) in the text, the 
G,(r)  = g,(r) + +,(d  1 
CS=,  P”-Wslt) [E,(kB,(f))Yl  3 
+,(r) = C:Ir’P~-~.rr(slt)E,(o.  - tJ  (A2b) 
where  .rr(sIt) denotes  the probability  that  the person  will  be alive in year  s, 
given that he is alive in year t. Given the random Markov assumption, +,(I)  can 
be written as 
(‘43)  +,(r) = C:I:PS-r.rr(slt)p”-‘(w,  -  6,)  = K,(r)u,, 
where K,(r) = E,:=:(Pp)”-‘.rr(slt)  and u, = w, -  5,. The simplification results 
from the fact that at time t the expected value of u,,  = o,~  -  6, is p‘-’v,, for all 
future years  s. (The term K,(r) cumulates the deflators that yield the present 
value  in year  t of  the future expected values  of the random  components  of 
utility. The further r is in the future, the larger is K,(r).  That is, the more distant 
the potential  retirement  age, the greater the uncertainty  about it, yielding  a 
heteroskedastic disturbance term.) Thus, G,(r)  may be written simply as 209  Pension Plan Provisions and Retirement 
('44) 
If the employee is to retire in year  r,  G,(r)  must  be less than zero for every 
potential retirement age r in the future. If  r: is the r that yields the maximum 
value of g,(  r)/K,(r),  the probability of retirement becomes 
(-45)  Pr[Retire in year  r]  = Pr[g,(r;)/K,(r;)  < -wJ . 
If retirement in only one year is considered, this expression is all that is needed. 
More generally, retirement decisions may be considered  over two or more 
consecutive years. In this case, the retirement probabilities are simply an exten- 
sion of equation (10). The probability that a person who is employed at age t 
will retire at age T >  r is given by 
('46) 
G,(r)  = g,(r)  + K,(r)u,. 
Pr[R = TI  = Pr[g,(r;)/K,(r:)  > -u,, . . . , 
g~-l(r~-,)/K~-l(r~-,)  >  g7(r:YK7(r;)  < -uJ . 
The probability that the person does not retire during the period of the data is 
given by 
('47)  Pr[R > r] = Pr[g,(r;)/K,(r:)  > -ur,  . . . , 
gr-,(r;-,)/Kr-i(r~-i)  > -u,-i,  gr(r;)/Kr(r;)  > -~rl  . 
This is a multinomial discrete choice probability with dependent error terms u,. 
Finally, we assume that us  follows a Gaussian Markov process, with 
(A81 
where the initial value, u,,  is i.i.d. N(0,a2)  and is independent of E,. The covari- 
ance between  u,  and u,,,  is pVar(u,),  and the  variance  of  u,,  for T  > r,  is 
The estimates in this paper are based on retirement decisions in only one 
year, and the random terms in equation  (5)  are assumed to follow a random 
walk, with p = 1. In this case, the covariance between u,  and uT+,  is Var(u,), 
and the variance of u,,  for T  5  r, is uz + (T -  t)cr;.  Prior estimates show that 
one- and multiple-year estimates are very similar. (Estimates based on several 
consecutive years and with p estimated are shown in Stock and Wise  1990b. 
These generalizations have little effect on the estimates.) 
u,~  = pu,-,  + E,,  with E, i.i.d. N(0,  a:), 
(p*lT-/))cr?  + (Z,y  pqa;. 
The Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model 
The dynamic programming  model is based on the recursive representation 
of the value function. At the beginning of year r, the individual has two choices: 
retire now and derive utility from future retirement benefits, or work for the 
year  and  derive utility  from income while working during the year and  re- 
taining the option to choose the best of retirement  or work in the next year. 
Thus the value function W,  at time r is defined as 210  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
W, = max{E,[U,(Y,)  + E,, + PW,+,I,  E,[C.~=,P"(U,(B,(~))  + E~JII, 
with W,+, = max{E,+,[~,(Y,+,)  + %+,  + PW,+21, 
E,+,[C:=,+,  P'-'-'(U,(B,(r  + 1)) + E*T)119 
(A91 
etc., where P is the discount factor and, as in the option value model, S is the 
year beyond which the person will not live. 
Because  the  errors E!, are assumed  to be  i.i.d., E,E,,,, = 0, for T  > 0. In 
addition, in computing expected values, each future utility must be discounted 
by the probability of realizing it, i.e., by  the probability of surviving to year T 
given that the worker is alive in year t, r(T1t). With these considerations, the 
expression (A9) can be written as 
W,  = max{W,, + E,,, Wzf  + E~,}  ,  where 
W,,  = U,(Y,) + P.rr(f + 1  I f)E,  W,+,  and 
The worker chooses to retire in year f if W,,  + E,, < W2,  + E~,;  otherwise he 
continues working. The probability that the individual retires is Pr[W,,  + E,, 
< W2,  + EJ.  If  a person works until the mandatory retirement age (741, he 
retires and receives expected utility  W2,,,. 
Recursions and Computation 
With a suitable assumption on the distribution of the errors  E,,, the expres- 
sion (A10) provides the basis for a computable recursion for the nonstochastic 
terms m,,  in the value  function. The extreme  value and normal distribution 
versions of the model are considered in turn. 
Extreme  value errors. Following  Berkovec and Stern  (1988),  the  E,, are as- 
sumed to be i.i.d. draws from an extreme value distribution with scale parame- 
ter u. Then, for the years preceding mandatory retirement, these assumptions 
together with equation (16) imply that 
E,W,+,/u = Fl+l 
= ye  + 1n[exp(w,,+,/u)  + ~~p~~zl+l~~~~ 
= ye + ln[exp(Uw(Y,+,)/u)exp(P.rr(t  + 2 It + 1)pI+J  + ex~(W~,+~/u)I  , 
where y, is Euler's constant. Thus equation (A1  1) can be solved by backward 
recursion,  with the terminal  value  coming from the  terminal condition  that 
The extreme value distributional assumption provides a closed form expres- 
(All) 
- 
F,,,  -  WZ,,,. 
sion for the probability of retirement in year t: 
(A12)  Pr[Retire in year t] = Pr[W,, +  < WZf  + EJ 
= exp(WZf/u)/[exp(m,,/a)  + exp(W2,/u)]. 211  Pension Plan Provisions and Retirement 
Gaussian errors. Following Daula and Moffitt (1989), the E,, are assumed to 
be independent draws from an N(0,u2)  distribution. The Gaussian assumption 
provides a simple expression for the probability of retiring: 
(A  13)  Pr[Retire in year t] 
= Pr[(EI, -  EJ@  < (W2,  -  W,,)/-\IZa]  = @(a,), 
where a, = (W2,  -  wlr)/@.  Then the recursion (A10) becomes 
(A 14)  E,Wl+,I~  = k+I 
= (wlr+lml  -  @(Q,+I)l  + (%lA,wwl+,)  + .i2$(.,+,) 
where +(*) denotes the standard normal density and @(*) denotes the cumula- 
tive normal distribution function. As in equation (A13), @(a,>  is the probability 
that the person retires in year r and receives utility w21,  plus utility from E(E>,  I 
E,, -  E*, < w2, - WIJ. The latter term, plus a comparable term when  the 
person continues to work, yields the last term in equation (A14). 
Individual-specific Effects 
Individual-specific terms are modeled as random effects but are assumed to 
be fixed over time for a given individual. They enter the two versions of the 
dynamic programming models in different ways. Each is discussed in turn. 
Extreme value errors. Single-year utilities are 
(A15a)  Uw(Yr)  = Yi 1 
(A15b)  U,(B,(s)) = [qk4(s)l7  9 
where qk  is constant over time for the same person, but random across individ- 
uals. Specifically, it is assumed that q is a lognormal random variable with 
mean one and scale parameter A: q = exp(Az + 1/2 A2),  where z is i.i.d. N(0,l). 
A larger  A  implies  greater variability among employee tastes for retirement 
versus  work; when  A  = 0 there is no variation and all employees have the 
same taste. 
Normal errors.  In  this  case,  the unobserved  individual  components are as- 
sumed to enter additively, with 
(A16a) 
(A 16b) 
UJY,) = y: + L 
U,(B,(s))  = [kB,(s)lY t 
where y and k are nonrandom parameters, as above, but 5 is a random additive 
taste for work, assumed to distributed N(0,A2). When h = 0, there is no taste 
variation. 
In  summary, the dynamic programming  models are given  by  the general 
recursion equation (A9). It is implemented as shown in equation (A1  1) under 212  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
the assumption that the c,,  are i.i.d. extreme value, and as shown in equation 
(A14) under the assumption that e!,  are i.i.d. normal. The retirement probabili- 
ties are computed according to equations (A12) and (A13) respectively.  The 
fixed effect:,  specifications are given by equations (A15) and (A16). The un- 
known parameters to be estimated are y. k, p, u,  and A. Because of the different 
distributional assumptions, the scde parameter cr  is  not comparable across 
option value or dynamic  progratnrning models, and h is not comparable across 
the two dynatnic progranznzing models. 
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Comment  John Rust 
This paper continues and extends earlier research by the authors (Lumsdaine, 
Stock, and Wise  1991) that compares two different dynamic structural mod- 
els-the  Stock-Wise (1990) “option-value’’ (OV) model and a dynamic pro- 
gramming (DP) model-on  the basis of  their ability to make accurate out- 
of-sample predictions of the effect of “window plans,” which provide special 
pension incentives to retire from a firm. I like this research very much, espe- 
cially for its clever use of the window plans as “natural experiments” to evalu- 
ate predictive validity of structural econometric models. In my survey of the 
literature (Rust, in press), I cite the authors’ results as one of the clearest dem- 
onstrations of the potential payoffs to dynamic structural modeling: both the 
OV and DP models do a much better job of predicting the large increase in 
firm departure rates than any of the traditional  “reduced-form’’ econometric 
specifications. These are the kind of results that Marschak (1953) and Lucas 
(1976) must have had in mind when they wrote their critiques of the traditional 
reduced-form econometric approaches to policy evaluation. However, for rea- 
sons I discuss below, the structural forecasts from these models are still a long 
way from being definitive. I think the most important contribution of this paper 
is that it provides an excellent example of the kinds of discriminating out-of- 
sample predictive tests we ought to be subjecting our econometric models to. 
Unfortunately,  too  many  structural estimation  exercises are little  more than 
displays of technique that do not seriously attempt to evaluate model perfor- 
mance. I believe that this research will set a new standard for demonstrating 
the credibility of structural econometric models. 
Although there are some differences  in the predictions of  the two models 
(with the OV model fitting better in-sample  and the DP model fitting better 
out-of-sample), as well  as significant differences  in the parameter  estimates 
(with the OV model yielding a significantly higher estimate of the postretire- 
ment “leisure value” of income K, and the DP model yielding a significantly 
lower estimate of the discount factor p), I am more struck by the overall simi- 
larity of the predictions  of  the two models rather than their differences. The 
similarity is striking in  view  of  the  large conceptual  differences  in the two 
approaches  and is suggestive of  an  identification problem  I have discussed 
elsewhere (Rust, in press). Even within the class of DP models, there are differ- 
ent parameter combinations that generate similar retirement behavior: for ex- 
ample, the predictions of DP models with a low value of b, a high value of K, 
and a high value of  y  (the coefficient of  relative  risk aversion, with y  = 1 
corresponding to risk neutrality) look very similar to models with a high value 
for  and lower values for K and y. We can also see this effect in comparing 
the estimated parameters of the OV and DP models in columns (3) and (6) of 
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table 6.1. The fact that very different parameter estimates yield similar behav- 
ioral predictions  is a bit disturbing.  The problem  is even  more  pronounced 
in the authors’ earlier paper, in which a DP model with normally distributed 
unobservables  has fi  = .916 and K  = 2.975, whereas  a comparably  fitting 
extreme value specification has fi = .62 and K = 1.88. Despite the fact that 
the normal specification seems to put much more weight on the future than the 
extreme value specification, the fit and predictions of the two models is very 
similar. Undoubtedly, the reason for this similarity can be traced to important 
differences  in the variance of the error terms and the specification of unob- 
served heterogeneity. However, for prediction purposes, this raises some diffi- 
cult issues: which is the “right” behavioral model, OV or DP? Even if we limit 
ourselves, a priori, to the narrower class of  DP models, it is not difficult to 
show that there are equivalence classes of distinct error distributions and pa- 
rameter values that yield similar behavioral predictions. We might be tempted 
to believe that as long as the predictions of  these different models are similar, 
the question  of  deciding which  is the “right” model  is moot, For reasons  I 
discuss below, I think it is likely that there are many hypothetical pension poli- 
cies for which the predictions of these models will be significantly different, 
such as pension plans where there is nonnegligible  uncertainty regarding fu- 
ture payoffs (as in defined contribution plans). I would like to see more work in 
delineating the conditions under which the predictions of their various models 
diverge-this  might suggest new experiments that might help us discriminate 
between the various models. 
Another problem  is that the structural coefficient  estimates  vary  substan- 
tially  from data set to data set. For example the OV model estimated  in the 
previous paper had fi = 39.5, which is significantly lower than the .962 value 
reported here, and the estimated value of K is 2.42 in this data set, versus 1.47 
in  the earlier  paper.  How  are we  to interpret  this parameter  variability?  If 
people really are this heterogeneous,  will we have to gather separate data to 
forecast the retirement behavior at each different firm? One way to get a handle 
on this issue is to see how well out-of-sample forecasts using the parameters 
from their previous data set perform on the current data, and vice versa. 
The remainder of my comments focus on identifying the situations where 
the predictions  of  the OV and DP models will be similar and the situations 
where their predictions will diverge. As the authors have noted in their paper, 
the OV and DP models  differ primarily  in the interchange  of  the orders in 
which the maximization and expectation operators are taken. In the OV model, 
at each time t the worker calculates the maximum of the expected discounted 
utility of retiring at different future dates, whereas in the DP model the worker 
compares the value of retiring now with the value of continuing to work at least 
one more period, where the value function (or “shadow price”) is calculated as 
the expectation of the maximum of  the discounted utility retiring next period 
versus continuing to work in period t + 1. In the OV model, a worker retires 
in the first period t in which the expected utility of immediate retirement ex- 215  Pension Plan Provisions and Retirement 
ceeds the expected utility of  retiring at any future date t  + r;  whereas in the 
DP model, the worker retires in the first period t where the value of retiring at 
time t exceeds the value of continuing to work until date t + 1. In a certain 
sense, the OV model seems to take a longer view of the future, since it calcu- 
lates the value of retiring at all future dates t + r;  whereas the DP model ap- 
pears to look only one period ahead at the value function V,,,.  However, since 
V,,,  is calculated by  backward induction, it provides the correct valuation of 
discounted expected utility, recursively generating the optimal retirement pol- 
icy.  The OV calculations  are not based on a correct evaluation of  expected 
discounted utility and, hence, will generally not yield an optimal decision rule. 
Indeed, the  very  terminology  “option  value  model”  is  actually  a misnomer 
since the Stock-Wise model ignores the option value of staying on the job to 
take advantage of  a possible increase in future salary, an option that is lost if 
one retires (since retirement is treated as an absorbing state in this model). By 
evaluating future utility as the expected value of  the maximum of  the options 
of staying with the firm at least one more period versus retiring now, the DP 
model assigns the correct value to this option. Given that an OV decisionmaker 
is in a sense myopic, or “time inconsistent,” why is it that the predictions of 
the DP and OV models are so similar? 
The answer is that the predictions of the two models will coincide provided 
that the level of future uncertainty is sufficiently small: in that case the maxi- 
mum of  the expected values is close to the expected value of maximum.  In 
particular, if there is little uncertainty about future wages, then the option value 
of possible future wage increases is negligible, so the predictions of  the OV 
model, which ignores this option, will be very similar to the DP model, which 
explicitly accounts for it. However in models where there are significant future 
uncertainties, we can expect that the predictions  of the models will be very 
different. Steven Stem (1994) was one of the first to make this point, and his 
paper provides numerical examples showing conditions under which the OV 
and  DP decision  rules  diverge.  His  Monte Carlo experiments  show  that  if 
agents are really behaving according to a DP model and one tries to approxi- 
mate this behavior using an OV model, the parameter estimates and predictions 
of the OV model can be significantly biased “because . . . the option value of 
working is significant relative to the option value of  retiring” (p. 6). On the 
other hand, Stern found that biases resulting from incorrect specification of the 
particular distribution of the error term were insignificant, provided one stays 
within the basic DP framework. 
It is easiest to illustrate the conditions under which the DP and OV solutions 
differ in a simple two-period model, but the logic extends to any number of 
periods. Consider the model with no uncertainty, first. Suppose the worker is 
risk neutral and earns wage W, = W,  if working in periods 1 and 2, and retire- 
ment benefit rW, if retired, where r is the replacement rate (if the worker retires 
at the beginning of period 2, he also receives retirement benefits rW,).  Thus, 
at time t the utility of working is W,  and the utility of retiring is KrW,, where 216  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
K is the parameter reflecting the additional value of  leisure in retirement. For 
concreteness assume that r = 3/4 and K = 8/5, so the utility of retiring equals 
(6/5)W,.  Now consider the worker’s decision problem at time  1 under the OV 
model:  the  worker  compares the  utility  of  retiring  immediately,  (6/5)W, + 
(6/5)W,  = (12/5)W,, with the utility  of retiring at time  2, W, + (6/5)W,  = 
(1  1/5)W,,  or of not retiring at all, W,  + W, = (10/5)W,. The optimal decision 
is clearly to retire at time  1. Now consider solving the problem by DP. We start 
in the last period and note that if the worker is already retired his value function 
is Vz = (6/5)W2  = (6/5)W,.  whereas if the worker has not yet retired his value 
function V2 = max[  W,, (6/5)W,],  which also equals (6/5)W,.  Then in period  1 
an unretired worker compares the value W,  + V, = (1 1/5)W, of continuing to 
work with the value (6/5)W,  + V, = (12/5)W, of retiring immediately, and we 
see that the DP and OV decision rules coincide with the recommendation  to 
retire in period 1. 
Now suppose that period 2 wages are uncertain but are not expected to in- 
crease: E{  W,} = W,.  It is easy to see that the OV model predicts that retire- 
ment in period  1 is still optimal: since @,  has conditional expectation  W,, the 
earlier calculations are unchanged. The presence of uncertainty does change 
the DP decision rule, which differs from the OV decision rule when the vari- 
ance in W2  is sufficiently large. In period 2,  we have V, = (6/5)W,  if the worker 
is already retired, and V, = max[wJ6/5)W,]  if the worker is not yet retired. 
The optimal decision rule is to continue working in period 2 provided  W2  > 
(6/5)W,.  In period  1, an unretired worker compares the expected value of retir- 
ing immediately, (12/5)W,, with the expected value of continuing to work one 
more period,  W,  + E{VJW,}.  If  E{V,(W,} > (7/5)W,,  then  the worker will 
decide to continue to work rather than retire in period  1, and the difference in 
these terms gives the loss in utility  of following the OV decision rule. This 
difference is positive provided that the variance in  W2 is sufficiently large. In 
such a situation a worker would want to use DP to calculate the optimal retire- 
ment policy, since it correctly accounts for the option value of continued em- 
ployment, yielding higher utility than the OV decision rule. 
In the specifications estimated in this paper, the major computational simpli- 
fication is the assumption that there is no future uncertainty about wages: work- 
ers have perfectly certain point predictions about their future wage profiles at 
the firm (computed from regressions on individuals’ wage histories). The only 
uncertainty in the OV model comes via two error terms corresponding to unob- 
servable factors affecting the utility  of  work and retirement. Although  these 
error terms are treated as random walk processes, the estimated standard devia- 
tion of the innovation of the random walk is relatively small (.  1 l), so the error 
components are not a major source of future Uncertainty. In the DP model, the 
error terms entering the period utility functions are assumed to be iid., and 
the estimated standard deviation of these error terms is also small (.22).  Thus, 
there are two factors responsible for the similarity in the predictions of the OV 
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profiles,  and  (2)  the  estimated  variances  of  random  utility  components  are 
small. 
My guess is that we would see much more significant differences between 
the DP and OV models once we allow for future wage uncertainty.  It is not 
clear how uncertain workers are about their future wages, but this is clearly an 
empirical matter that needs to be addressed. At a minimum, it would be inter- 
esting to see the R2  values from the wage regressions (which are not reported). 
I have estimated DP models that allow for wage uncertainty (Phelan and Rust 
1991; Rust and Phelan 1993), predicting the entire distribution of future wages, 
not just the mean.  I find substantial  variation  in future wage  earnings even 
conditional on the worker’s past wage history, in real terms. Part of  this uncer- 
tainty is undoubtedly an artifact of aggregation of planned hours of work, since 
my  model forecasts future earnings over an  entire year, conditional  on next 
year’s employment being in one of two categories, full- or part-time. It is plau- 
sible that  many  workers have a fairly good idea of  their future wages on a 
week-by-week or month-by-month basis. Thus, to some extent, the appropriate 
level of  variance in future wages depends on the fineness of the time grain of 
the decision problem. However, many workers do face significant uncertainties 
regarding the level of future bonuses (including the window plan itself). These 
uncertainties may induce a significant option value for remaining with the firm. 
I would have liked to have seen a fuller discussion of this issue, since it seems 
to be the most important factor underlying the similarities in the predictions of 
these two very different models. 
Beyond  wage  earnings,  the  major  source of  uncertainty  neglected  by  the 
models in this paper is health-care costs. All of the models estimated in this 
paper and in the authors’ earlier work miss the big peak in retirements at age 
65. Although one might argue that the age-65 peak reflects a sociological ef- 
fect, I think a much more compelling economic story is that the peak reflects 
an interaction effect between private health insurance and the “Medicare op- 
tion”: unhealthy  workers choose to remain  under the firm’s more  generous 
group health plan until they are able to supplement their pension health-care 
coverage with Medicare insurance at age 65, whereas relatively healthy work- 
ers take advantage of the window plan, since they are able to purchase supple- 
mental private medical insurance at attractive rates. The authors include Medi- 
care  by  adding  the  average  value  of  Medicare payments  to the retirement 
benefit calculated  without Medicare and find “little support for the value of 
Medicare that we have used here.” I do not think that this is the proper way to 
treat Medicare: risk-averse  workers are concerned about the small chance of 
uninsured  catastrophic health-care costs, so the certainty equivalent value of 
Medicare  is much higher  than the expected value of benefits paid. It seems 
likely that many of the workers in the age-65 peak could have health problems 
that would make it prohibitively costly for them to purchase supplemental pri- 
vate health insurance if they retire before age 65. Many of  these workers will 
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fits until Medicare kicks in at age 65, removing a substantial share of the risks 
of catastrophic health-care costs. Indeed, this is what I have found after explic- 
itly incorporating the uncertainties  surrounding health-care costs into my DP 
model  (with health-care expenditures  turning out to be almost perfectly  ap- 
proximated  by  the  Pareto  distribution).  Our recent  paper (Rust and Phelan 
1993) shows that by explicitly modeling the distribution of health-care costs 
(as opposed to treating it as an expected value), we obtain DP models that are 
able to capture the peak in retirement at age 65 that the Lumsdaine, Stock, and 
Wise approach misses. 
There is a final option that the models in this paper ignore: the option of 
returning to work after retirement. The authors’ models rule out this option by 
assumption: retirement is treated as an absorbing state. One might argue that 
future re-employment opportunities are implicitly captured in the error terms. 
However, the fact that the error terms are i.i.d. in the DP model  makes this 
interpretation less plausible: the calculation of the value of retiring does not 
properly value the option of finding an attractive new job after retiring from 
the current job. In reality, some workers know that their employment record is 
sufficiently  good that they will  always have the option of  returning  to their 
career job or a similar job if they find that retirement does not suit them, experi- 
ence unexpected financial problems, or encounter an unexpected, attractive job 
offer. The possibility of the re-employment option may be a crucial element of 
a risk-averse worker’s decision to take advantage of an early retirement plan. 
In  Rust  (1990) and Rust  and  Phelan  (1993), I show that  in the  Retirement 
History Survey, less than half of  all work histories involve the discontinuous 
employedhetired trajectory implicit in the authors’ model. Indeed, at least one- 
third of all work histories involve multiple transitions in and out of the labor 
force, suggesting that postretirement work in a noncareer job is a fairly com- 
mon phenomenon  (similar results can be found in Berkovec and Stem 1991, 
using the National Longitudinal Survey). It is not clear what kinds of specifi- 
cation errors are generated by ruling out the possibility of postretirement work. 
For the fraction of the sample who follow the “traditional” retirement profile, 
preferring to remain permanently out of work, the error may not be substantial. 
However for risk-averse workers who face substantial financial uncertainties 
at the brink  of retirement, ruling out the re-employment option substantially 
increases the riskiness of the retirement decision. The model may be able to 
generate a good overall fit to the data by underestimating p and overestimating 
the value of leisure, K, but it is not clear whether the resulting model will do a 
good job of  tracking the behavior of various subgroups of employees with dif- 
fering views of their re-employment prospects. 
From a larger perspective, we are not only concerned about departure rates 
from particular firms, but the overall dynamics of employment at the end of 
the life cycle. The simple models  estimated  here are unable  to address this 
larger question. Although the DP model is sufficiently flexible that it can be 
generalized  to address  a broad  variety  of  issues, including  uncertain  future 
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Stern 1991; Rust and Phelan 1993), it is unclear whether the OV model can be 
generalized  to encompass these  features.  In  their  earlier  paper, the authors 
stressed the point of  computational complexity, arguing that the OV calcula- 
tions are simpler to implement than the DP calculations. However I have seen 
no clear-cut evidence that this is so: both the OV and DP models can be solved 
very quickly on a 386 computer, and if there is any speed advantage to the OV 
model, it does not seem to be substantial. Viewing the brain as a massive paral- 
lel processor, I think few would disagree that people have far greater reasoning 
abilities than  a 386 computer. Therefore I  find it hard to buy the  story that 
humans adopt the OV decision rule because it is simpler to implement than a 
DP decision rule. 
Once we allow for the possibility of  re-employment after retirement, there 
is no obvious way to calculate the value of retirement other than the backward 
induction process of  DP. While I view the OV model as a very useful point of 
departure for addressing the specific question of  modeling the effect of  firm 
pension plan provisions on exit rates, I think it has real limitations in its ability 
to properly account for the options arising from uncertainty about future earn- 
ings and employment possibilities.  However at the same time,  I  must stress 
that there is nothing sacred about DP models: which type of model best de- 
scribes people’s behavior is ultimately an empirical issue. Even though all of 
these models will probably ultimately be regarded as stepping stones toward 
more realistic behavioral models, it is clear that the authors’ careful attempts 
to discriminate between their simple OV and DP specifications have contrib- 
uted a great deal to our understanding of  retirement behavior. 
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Comment  James P.  Smith 
In the first-generation economic research on retirement, the emphasis was on 
learning about the role of Social Security. In that work, private pensions were 
assigned a largely secondary role, partly because the data on private pensions 
were so limited. Largely due to the impetus of the NBER’s program project on 
the  economics of  aging,  the  best  of  the  second-generation  studies  demon- 
strated how critical the provisions of private pension plans were for retirement. 
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise have been the major contributors to that literature, 
and in this paper, they offer us another impressive addition to their body of 
work. In my view, this trio of authors is largely responsible for convincing the 
economics and policy community  about the importance of private pensions. 
Their earlier work was based on data from a single firm. This paper generalizes 
that work in an important and necessary direction by  using data from another 
large private-sector firm. 
This paper sets out four principal goals: (1) to compare the predictive value 
of options value and dynamic programming models. (2)  to evaluate how well 
pension plan provisions predict retirement behavior, (3) to compare how well 
these models predict retirement behavior of men and women, and (4) to evalu- 
ate the effect of  Medicare on retirement. Much of the emphasis is devoted to 
the first two aims, with considerably  less attention paid  to the last two. My 
main suggestion, in fact, is that the value added of their work could be higher 
if that emphasis were reversed. 
I found the battle between  the two dominant theoretical  models the least 
interesting part of the paper. This battle is part of a war no one can win. Indeed, 
winning or losing the battle as described here has little to do with the war. As 
the authors recognized, their dynamic programming  model is a very special- 
ized and quite restrictive case of an infinite variety of equally plausible alterna- 
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tives. They are able to test particular variants of  two theoretical frameworks, 
but  this is certainly  not a test of  the relative usefulness  of  the option value 
and the dynamic programming approaches. Their work here, and similar tests 
contained in their earlier papers, demonstrate that both theoretical approaches 
are useful and give reasonable results. Perhaps we should leave it at that and, 
within either model, get on to the more substantive issues that occupy the rest 
of their paper. 
To obtain out-of-sample tests of their model, Lumsdaine et al. predict depar- 
ture rates during years when the firm instituted a window plan. This use of 
window plans to test retirement models is growing in popularity, but I want to 
sound some cautionary notes because it makes me uneasy. In a nutshell, my 
problem is that, when firms introduce these windows, many other fundamental 
changes are taking  place  in the work  environment.  These other,  coincident 
changes may also affect departure rates so that the experiment may be contami- 
nated. 
Windows are typically used, as appears to be the case here, to achieve  a 
large-scale downsizing of the work force. My concern  stems from my work 
with another large Fortune 500 firm which also introduced pension plans. I am 
familiar with this firm because they were involved in litigation about their pen- 
sion plan, including its window provisions. 
In  my  case, when  the window plan  was introduced,  the  very  viability  of 
the firm was at stake. In fact, the smart bet, as confirmed by  its low single- 
digit stock price, was that the firm would  not make it. The prospect  for the 
employees  of  that  firm  were  dim indeed.  They  were  understandably  wor- 
ried about whether  they would  even have their current  salaries or jobs in a 
few years. There were allegations that employees were told that they would 
be  fired  if  they  did  not  participate  in  the  pension  plan.  Most  instances 
when  firms  use  window  plans  are  not  so severe as  this one, but  the  more 
general principle  applies. When window  plans are used, firms are trying to 
seriously restructure the size and composition of their work force. They may 
be dropping entire lines in which  older workers’  skills are specialized,  and 
they  have  little incentive  to invest in new  skills for these older employees. 
At  best, prospects for  salary  increases  and  promotions  for these  workers 
become much worse than they were. If  this is a reasonably  accurate charac- 
terization  of  the time period  when window plans are used, it may be prob- 
lematic to use the window period as a test of  the parameters  of the pension 
plan. 
An alternative way  of providing out-of-sample  tests is available, which at 
the very least is complementary to the use of windows. Lumsdaine et al. have 
previously  estimated  the  parameters  of  this  model  with  data  from another 
private-sector firm. Using the parameters  estimated in the previous firm, the 
model can be used to predict retirement behavior in this new firm. One objec- 
tion is that the worker or the nature of the firm are too different to provide a 
meaningful  test. But at some level that objection has to fail. If  firms are so 222  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
heterogeneous that they have little in common, we may not be learning much 
from data on individual firms. 
In future work, I hope that the emphasis of the authors’ research shifts to 
looking at the second two goals of  the paper-predicting  women’s retirement 
rates  and  incorporating  other components of  the  fringe package  into their 
model,  particularly  those  involving health  benefits.  Almost all  existing  re- 
search examines male retirement decisions. The eye-catching result here is that 
women’s hazard rates of leaving the firm are little different from those of men. 
The reason this seems surprising at first blush is that it runs against the grain 
of most of the labor supply literature. Female labor-force participation begins 
to decline at a younger age and more rapidly than men’s. In addition, female 
labor supply appears to be sensitive to male characteristics such as husband’s 
wages. In contrast, Lumsdaine et al. are able to predict similar female exit rates 
without knowing  anything about husbands, including  whether they  have re- 
tired. 
The patterns of these female departure rates are fascinating, and Lumsdaine 
et al. are on the brink of an important contribution. The differences with the 
age pattern of female labor-force participation rates may be reconciled, in part, 
because their data actually measure departure rates from the firm. Any depar- 
tures from the firm for women are more likely to be out of the labor force than 
to another job. In a similar vein, the departure rates in their paper are condi- 
tional on years of service. Most of the male-female difference may come in the 
distribution of years of service rather than in these conditional departure rates. 
But even this reconciliation fails to address the question of  why they are so 
successful in predicting female departure rates without any knowledge about 
the current situation of  the husbands of these women. Since the husbands are 
typically older, does this mean that the family waits until both members retire 
optimally (based on their own financial incentives) before entering retirement 
life (including migrating to more amenable areas)? Current sex discrimination 
laws have had the bizarre interpretation of not permitting the longer life expec- 
tancies of  women to affect the yearly flows of benefits. What is the impact of 
that sex bias in favor of women in their retirement behavior? The Lumsdaine 
et al. paper is breaking new ground in which we will be able for the first time 
to explore these fascinating questions. 